In General
At earlier common law, expert testimony was permitted only if the subject was so beyond the ken, the understanding and experience, of the average juror that the jury could not begin to interpret the facts on its own.
The modem rule, however, is not so strict: as codified in the second clause of Md. Rule 5-702, it provides that expert testimony will be admissible if it "will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue .... " Whether the evidence will be helpful -as well as whether a particular witness is qualified as an expert -is decided by the trial court, in its discretion.
b. Possible Rulint:s as to Helpfulness/Admissibility
When expert testimony is offered, there are three possible results under Rule 5-702.
(1) The first is that proffered expert testimony is inadmissible, because it would not assist the jury. This can be because of one of two reasons:
Either (a) The jury would not need it at all to objectively evaluate the facts ...
Example:
Truck Ins. Exchange v. Marks Rentals, Inc., 285 Md. 428 (1980) (abuse of discretion to allow insurance expert's testimony as to meaning of contract clause, "passenger cars he may rent to others or operate under his Thrifty Rent-A-Car franchise," when the words used had no technical meaning).
or (b) The proffered expert opinion has an insutTiciently reliable basis (e.g., "junk science"). This possibility will be explored further in parts IX.-X. infra.
(2) A second possibility is that the court or the jury needs expert testimony, because common sense and logic are insufficient to evaluate the facts. Expert testimony is not only admissible, it may be necessary in order for a party to meet its burden of production of the evidence, so as to withstand a motion for judgment.
Examples:
(1) In a medical malpractice case, P offers testimony of a lab technician that a pre-operation blood test showed that the osmillality in P's blood was 480 micromoles per second. (3) A third possibility is that the party does not need expert testimony to meet its burden of production, but it would be helpful to the fact-finder. In this situation, expert testimony will be admissible, in the court's discretion.
Problem.
1.
Determine which of the above three standards applies to each of the following scenarios from an early dental malpractice case, Toy v. Mackintosh, 110 N.E. 1034 (Mass. 1916).
P-Patient sued D-Dentist for negligence in letting a tooth fall down P's throat. P testifies he had several teeth extracted by D while P was under an anesthetic, and that nine weeks later P coughed up a tooth (which he entered into evidence). a.
D moves for a directed verdict, on the ground that P failed to offer any expert testimony regarding breach of duty. Should the motion be granted?
b. D testifies to his own skill and experience and wishes to call other experts to testify to precautions routinely taken and, in effect, that P's inhaling of a tooth is consistent with due care. Should the court let in the expert testimony?
c. At the close of D's case, D again moves for a directed verdict, on the ground that his expert testimony "beats" P's testimony. Should his motion be granted?
d. Consider also the issue of causation of damages. P testified that he was in good health before the dental surgery. Soon after the operation, he developed a cough and severe pain in the left side of his body. Subsequently, he lost part of his ability to speak, grew dizzy, and his right arm and leg were numb. These symptoms continued at trial, although after he coughed up the tooth, his cough was immediately relieved. D's experts testify that the non-cough symptoms had nothing to do with the tooth and were caused instead by two shocks that P had received. D moves for a directed verdict on the damages issue regarding everything but the cough. Should the motion be granted?
See Giant Food, Inc. v. Booker, 2003 WL 22051771 *6-7 (Md. App. Sept. 3,2003) (absent a close temporal relationship between Freon incident and onset of asthma, expert testimony was needed to meet plaintiff s burden of production).
III. The Test as to Opinion Testimony, Whether Expert or Lay
No matter whether lay opinion (Rule 5-701) or expert opinion (Rule 5-702), the test for admissibility is whether the opinion is rationally based and will be helpful to the jury (or to the court as factfinder).
By virtue of Rule 5-704(a), there is no longer a per se rule barring legal conclusions. The question remains, rather, one of helpfulness.
A synthesis of the case law generates the following factors to be used in evaluating whether an opinion should be admitted:
1.
Is the opinion supported by a sufficient rational basis? Or, for example, is it merely speculation or conjecture? If a lay opinion, would the witness need to be an expert to reach a rational opinion?
2.
Will the opinion provide more information than the jury could get otherwise? Or will it be merely superfluous, so that the jury could figure it out just as well for itself? In that event, we want to avoid the possibility of undue influence on the jury by admitting opinion testimony.
3.
Will opinion testimony provide the most efficient and practical way for the jury to hear the evidence? Or could the testimony be helpfully ratcheted back to the underlying facts, so that we leave the jury to reach the conclusion on its own? (Let the jury "connect the dots.") See, e.g., Cook v. State, 84 Md. App. 122, 135-44 (1990) (reversible error to allow police officer to give expert opinions as to each defendant's role in drug operation; expert should have testified only "that the head of the organization is usually armed and usually has the organization's money on his person" and let the jury make further findings).
For good reason, therefore, the standard of appellate review is abuse of discretion. 
Problems.

2.
Plaintiff calls witness to testify that storeowner's leaving a barrel on the sidewalk outside his store was negligent. Admit? 6. In CINA proceeding, State calls mother-in-law of mother to testify that mother is a terrible housekeeper and that her home has always been filthy whenever motherin-law has visited. Admit?
And that daughter-in-law is "unfit to be a mother." Admit?
7.
In rape case, State's expert wishes to testify that rape victims often suffer PTSD. Admit? And that, indeed, the victim suffers from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, caused by rape. Admit? expert "was able, through history, to connect the PTSD to the criminal conduct charged").
See also Hutton v. State, 339 Md. 480 (1995) (reversible error to permit expert testimony that alleged sexual child abuse victim suffered from PTSD that was "not in any way faked," when basis of opinion was statements of child and it was, in effect, a comment on the victim's credibility; Allewalt was distinguished on ground that expert there was simply asked to "assume the victim's truthfulness") (Rodowsky, J., concurring, joined by Murphy C.J., disagreed, pointing out that excluding an expert's opinion, when it has a basis, part of which is the patient's history, has not been the law in Maryland; to reach a diagnosis of PTSD, the expert must find that the described stressor occurred).
In Hutton . .. prohibits counsel from (1) asking a witness directly whether he or she personally believes the testimony of another person, and (2) introducing expert testimony in a way that presents the trier of fact with an expert's assertion of personal belief that another person's testimony is true. Nothing in Hutton, however, prohibits an expert from opining that the child's behavioral problems are consistent with abuse.
The Hall court concluded, therefore, that the trial court had not committed error in permitting the state to elicit an expert's opinion that "there was a strong cause-effect relationship between child abuse and the disorders from which the victim was suffering" (although the better form for the opinion would have been that "the victim's disorders 'are consistent' with disorders found in children who have suffered sexual child abuse"). 107 Md. App. at 695.
The defense in Hall was that the child victim's charges were "fabrications or imaginations" and that the child was unworthy of belief because of conduct and stress disorders, the latter perhaps caused by having been placed in four different foster homes. Under the facts of the case, "[tJhe State was entitled to guard against the risk that the trier of fact would commit an 'untutored layman's error of dismissing as non-credible testimony that, in the arcane context of child abuse, should not be so readily dismissed.'" Id.
8.
Child who was in next room and could not see shooter is called to testify that her stepfather said nothing but pointed gun straight at her mom and then shot her mother. Admit? confrontation right by admitting hospital records of his daughter's-the complaining witness' -stay in hospital psychiatric unit, when records contained doctors' opinions that defendant may have sexually abused her; confrontation right is violated if opinions appeared to lack a legally adequate basis as in this case, or if the opinion is too ambiguous to be helpful).
V.
Telling the Chickens from the Eggs: Facts, Opinions, Experts, and Lay Witnesses § 1.
Of "Fact" Witnesses, "Opinion" Witnesses, "Testifying" Witnesses, and "Hybrid" Witnesses Just drawing the line between "facts" and "opinions" can be challenging. See Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 167-69 (1988) (discussing the analytical difficulty in drawing a line between "fact" and "opinion"), on remand, 868 F.3d 1531 (lIth Cir. 1989) (en banc). § 2.
Who May Testify as an Expert?
Under Rule 5-702, the trial judge determines, in his or her discretion, whether a particular proffered expert witness is qualified to testifY. As stated by Wigmore, the question for the trial court to consider in exercising this discretion is, "On this subject can a jury receive appreciable help from this person?" Formal education is not required. Rule 5-702 refers to "a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education .... " For example, fisherman, plumbers, and teenaged computer hackers could all be possible experts, 
Problems.
30.
Plaintiff calls an acupuncturist who had some college education but is not an osteopath, to testify to plaintiffs back injuries. Admit? 
Procedure
The proponent of an expert first must elicit the witness's qualifications on direct, then offer the witness as an expert in the designated field. The opponent may object, either on the ground that the subject matter is improper or that the witness is unqualified. With permission of the court, the opponent may voir dire the witness on these points --essentially during an interruption of the witness's direct examination.
If the court accepts the witness as an expert in the designated field, it will instruct the jury that the witness "has been accepted as an expert on [subject X] and is qualified to give his or her opinions on this subject."
• Note, however, that the Committee Note to the 2000 amendment to FRE 702 speaks favorably of District of Columbia's district Judge Richey's proposal that the witness be referred to not as an "expert," but rather as an "opinion witness. • Rule 5-701 provides:
Rule 5-701. OPINION TESTIMONY BY LAY WITNESSES If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness's testimony in the fonn of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (I) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (2) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness's testimony or the detennination of a fact in issue.
Rule 5-702 adds special requirements for expert testimony, and Rules 5-602, 5-703, 5-705, and 5-706 provide special benefits regarding experts. (Rule 5-706 empowers the court to appoint its own experts, if appropriate, though commentators complain that this power is underutilized by judges.) Special discovery rules also apply re: experts. A resulting problem in federal courts led to amendment of FRE 701 so that it explicitly does not apply to "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule Problems.
Maryland has seen no need for a similar amendment. Cf Dorsey v. Nold, 362 Md. 241 (2001) (reversible error not to permit medical malpractice plaintiffs to call medical examiner as expert in their case-in-chief, to testify that child died from asphyxia due to tumor's compression of airway; Rule 2-402(e)(l) did not require expert witness disclosure as to M.E., whose findings or opinions were not "acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation.").
35.
State trooper testified as a lay witness regarding accident. Expert testimony may be admitted, in the fonn of an opinion or otherwise, if the court detennines that the testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to detennine a fact in issue. In making that determination, the court shall determine (I) whether the witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, (2) the appropriateness of the expert testimony on the particular subject, and (3) whether a sufficient factual basis exists to support the expert testimony. § 2.
Rule 5-705
Rule 5-705. DISCLOSURE OF FACTS OR DATA UNDERLYING EXPERT OPINION.
Unless the court requires otherwise, the expert may testify in tenns of opinion or inference and give reasons therefor without first testifying to the underlying facts or data. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.
Rule 5-705 permits an expert to testify to an opinion or inference "without first testifYing to the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise." This provision was intended to free counsel from having to relate lengthy, soporific hypothetical questions, which by prior case law had to include every material fact in evidence essential to the formulation of the expert's opinion, e.g., Mathieson Alkali Works v. Redden, 177 Md. 560 (1940), before permitting the expert to testifY to his or her opInIOn.
Quaere:
• Still, what reason to have the expert state his or her basis, at least in general terms, is supplied by Rule 5-702?
• What tactical reason may remain that will encourage counsel to have his or her expert testifY to the underlying facts or data?
Suppose that the court accepts plaintiffs physician as an expert in the field of medicine. Plaintiffs counsel, having so qualified the witness, then abruptly asks the witness, "Do you have an opinion to a reasonable medical certainty as to the permanence of the plaintiffs injuries?" A. "Yes."
Q. "What is that opinion?"
Defense counsel: "Objection! Counsel is required to lay a factual basis for that opinion first!" Would you allow the question?
• What if the underlying data are inadmissible as substantive evidence? § 3.
Rule 5-703
Rule 5-703. BASES OF OPINION TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS.
(a) In general.
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
(b) Disclosure to jury.
If determined to be trustworthy, necessary to illuminate testimony, and unprivileged, facts or data reasonably relied upon by an expert pursuant to section (a) may, in the discretion of the court, be disclosed to the jury even if those facts and data are not admissible in evidence. Upon request, the court shall instruct the jury to use those facts and data only for the purpose of evaluating the validity and probative value of the expert's opinion or inference.
(c) Right to challenge expert.
This Rule does not limit the right of an opposing party to cross-examine an expert witness or to test the basis of the expert's opinion or inference.
Committee note. --Subject to Rule 5-403, and in criminal cases the confrontation clause, experts who rely on information from others may relate that information in their testimony if it is of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field. If it is inadmissible as substantive proof, it comes in merely to explain the factual basis for the expert opinion. The opposing party then is entitled to an instruction to the jury that it may consider the evidence only for that limited purpose. a.
Permissible Basis An expert's opinion may have either one or several bases, which must suffice to provide a rational basis for his or her opinion, which in turn is relevant to the substantive evidence developed in the case.
Like the opinions of a lay witness, an expert's opinions may be based on firsthand knowledge, such as examination of the personal injury plaintiff.
But, because experts are freed from the first-hand knowledge requirement (see Rules 5-602 and 5-703), the expert's opinion also may have a hearsay basis. (Rule 5-703 does not mean, however, that one may call an "expert" who simply parrots another's opinion, without adding anything of his or her own.) See Jackson v. Jackson, 249 Md. 170, 174 (1968) (expert opinion as to testator's mental incapacity inadmissible when merely based on opinions of other experts in records proffered in evidence).
The hearsay basis may be simply other witnesses' testimony in the case, that the expert has heard at trial. It may be out-of-court statements falling within exceptions to the hearsay rule.
But, under Rule 5-703, it also may be data inadmissible in evidence, that is reasonably relied upon by experts in the field. For example, a psychiatrist may rely on a psychologist's report, even though that report was prepared in anticipation of trial and would not qualify under the hearsay exception for business records.
Often an expert's opinion will be based on a combination of first-hand knowledge and hearsay. For example, the explosives experts who investigated the October 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole in Aden, Yemen, would have relied on both hearsay and their own personal examination of the ship. Whether particular information is reasonably relied on by the expert is to be determined by the court as a preliminary question of fact under Rule 5-1 04(a 
b.
For the Jury's Ears?
The question arises whether the jury should be informed of reasonably relied upon but substantively inadmissible hearsay on which an expert has relied.
• What are the risks in admitting it, even with a limiting instruction that it is admitted not for its truth, but only for the limited purpose of explaining the basis of the expert's opinion?
• What are the risks in excluding it?
Md. Rule 5-703(b), which was derived from the corollary Kentucky rule and became effective with the rest of Title 5 on July 1, 1994, leaves the question of disclosure of a substantively inadmissible hearsay basis to the discretion of the court, but cautions that it may be admitted only if the underlying basis is "determined to be trustworthy, necessary to illuminate testimony, and unprivileged . The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts Rule 5-704 addresses whether an opinion on an ultimate issue may be admitted, e.g., defectiveness of a product. Rule 5-704(a) treats experts just as it does lay witnesses: the question is always merely one of whether the opinion is rationally based and will be helpful to the trier of fact. See Rules 5-701 and 5-702. If it would not be helpful, it is inadmissible.
Problems.
38.
Lay witness's testimony to meaning of clause in testator's will. Admit? 
41.
In money laundering case, accused wishes to call psychologist to testify to his assessment of key government witness's personality disorders and the effect these disorders have on her ability to perceive, recall, and recount events accurately, including her ability to distinguish fact from fantasy; opinion is based on her medical records and on observing her demeanor while testifying. Admit? FRE 704(b), "the Hinckley amendment," was added in 1984, after John Hinckley's trial for the attempted assassination of President Reagan in an etTort to obtain the afTections of actress Jodie Foster. Hinckley was found to be insane and confined to St. Elizabeth's Hospital. Members of the psychiatric community subsequently objected that they should not be asked to testify to the ultimate legal issue, as they were in Hinckley. FRE 704(b) precludes experts from testifying in federal court to the ultimate issue of an accused's criminal responsibility or lack thereof. In federal court, their testimony must stop one step before that ultimate conclusion.
The last sentence of Md. Rule 5-704(b), on the other hand, is dramatically opposite. In line with a longstanding Maryland statute, experts in Maryland state court are permitted to testify to whether an accused who has raised the insanity ("lack of criminal responsibility") defense had the capacity to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of the law.
VIII. Sufficient Basis for Expert Testimony § 1. When Caesar Has Spoken, and Statutes Establish the Parameters, We Follow Caesar
Statutes apply to a number of areas of expert testimony. E.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 1 0-916(b) (battered spouse syndrome).
Expert testimony contradicting the premise underlying a statutory presumption is inadmissible. City of Frederick v. Shankle, 367 Md. 5 (2001) (trial court properly precluded expert's testimony that rejected premise underlying Md. Labor & Empl. Code Ann. § 9-503 presumption, that, because of stress of police work, police ot11cers who have heart disease are suffering from an occupational disease; expert could have testified only if he had simply attributed claimant's heart disease to other factors, and not that stress never causes heart disease). Cf Beatty v. TraUmaster Products, Inc., 330 Md. 726 (1993) (expert's opinion that the bumper height of defendant's vehicle was foreseeably unsafe and unreasonably dangerous lacked sufficient basis where the bumper height complied with a statutory standard, and the expert neither cited a developing consensus nor sound data to buttress his opinion). § 2. 
As to Areas of Expert Testimony Not Governed by
c. Even if the evidence passes muster under Rules 5-401 and 5-702, should the trial court exclude it in its discretion under Rule 5-403?
Quaere.
Rule 5-403 provides:
Rule
5-403. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
An eyewitness identifies the accused as the perpetrator of the charged robbery. The defense is an alibi. The defense wishes to call a psychologist to testify to the frailties of eyewitness testimony. Admit? What are the relevant considerations? But the Court of Appeals of Maryland has held that the trial judge has a duty to thoughtfully exercise his or her discretion as to whether to give the pattern jury instruction regarding eyewitness identification. Gunning v. State, 347 Md. 332, 374 (1997) (failure to exercise discretion was reversible error).
d.
This 401-702-403 analysis is the approach followed by the federal courts, as to all expert testimony. But with regard to novel, scientific evidence, Maryland follows instead the heightened standard of Frye-Reed.
IX.
Scientific Evidence: A Subcategory of Expert Opinion Evidence § 1.
Three Prerequisites for Admissibility
Scientific evidence is a subcategory of expert opinion evidence. When scientific evidence is offered, three foundational prerequisites must be laid: 
a. The Second and Third Requirements
The second and third requirements are relatively straightforward in general. They also are the subject of numerous statutes governing specific types of evidence, such as blood and breath tests for alcohol. Some of the statutes create presumptions of admissibility, which put the ball in the accused's court to request the presence at trial of the State's expert.
b.
The First Requirement: Soundness of the Underlying Principles
Recognition by Statute
With regard to the first requirement, the soundness of a number of scientific principles is governed by statute. In Maryland, these include, for example, radar, blood and breath tests for alcohol, certain DNA tests, and human leukocyte antigen blood tests for paternity.
Example: DNA Evidence In Amstead v. State, 342 Md. 38 (1996) , the Court of Appeals held (over the dissent of now C.l. Bell) that, because DNA evidence collected using the RFLP technique is made admissible by statute, generalized challenges to its admissibility are precluded. The statute also makes admissible expert testimony to statistics showing the odds of a random match under either the "product rule" or the "ceiling principle" method (in Amstead, 1 in 480,000,000 and 1 in 800,000, respectively). The statute precludes exclusion under Md. Rule 5-403: DNA evidence may be excluded only if it is irrelevant, or if case-specific defects in the testing procedure make particular limits unhelpful. The trial judge must permit the defense to cross-examine a State's DNA expert about testing errors and incidents of contamination at the lab in question. Williams. 
Judicial Notice
If sutliciently well established, it may be judicially noticed either through common general knowledge (e.g., the uniqueness of fingerprints) or by resort to indisputable sources. See Rule 5-201 (b) Gudicial notice is appropriate of facts that are "not subject to reasonable dispute" because they are either (1) "generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court" or (2) "capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." 
Example: Probability Evidence
Under generally accepted statistical theories, the likelihood of a particular event is the product obtained by multiplying the probability of each of its independent components. For example, the likelihood of rolling a 1 (or 2,3,4,5, or 6) on a die is 116.
The likelihood ofrolling "snake eyes" on two dice is 116 x 116 = 1136.
• Should such probability evidence be admissible with regard, for example, to whether a perpetrator was someone other than the accused? Or whether an infant's death was accidental?
In People v. Collins, 68 Ca1.2d 319 (1968), eyewitnesses testified that the charged robbery was committed by a white woman, who wore her blond hair in a ponytail, and a black man, who had a moustache and a beard. They fled in a partly yellow car. There was evidence that the defendants matched this description. Therefore, he testified, the odds of having a couple meet that description was 1112,000,000 (10 x 4 x 10 x 3 x 10 x 1,000 = 12,000,000).
Quaere. Is this admissible testimony?
Note that it gets complicated without a math expert to explain it. The probability in this example is not quite the same as the odds. Ifthere is 1 couple in 12,000,000 matching these characteristics, the probability that there is more than 1 is 41 %.
Should the prosecutor be permitted to argue that, if we believe the eyewitnesses' testimony, the evidence shows that we are 99. I have two canvas bags filled with poker chips. The first bag contains 70 green chips and 30 white chips, and I shall refer to this as the predominantly green (PG) bag. The second bag contains 70 white chips and 30 green chips, and I shall refer to this as the predominantly white (PW) bag. The chips are all identical except for color. I now mix up the two bags so that you don't know which is which, and I put one of them aside. Now suppose that you choose 12 chips at random from this remaining bag and it turns out that you draw eight green chips and four white chips.
• What do you think the probability is that the bag you have sampled from is predominantly green?
• Is it predominantly green by a preponderance of the evidence? By clear and convincing evidence? Beyond a reasonable doubt?
In Wilson v. State, 370 Md. 191 (2002), a father was charged with infanticide. Evidence showed that both that infant, and another infant fathered by the defendant, but with a different mother, had had sudden deaths in their cribs, when under the father's care. The trial judge admitted experts' testimony regarding their reliance on the probability, arrived at by using the product rule, of two SIDS deaths of infants having the same father. One prosecution expert concluded that the probability was 1 in 100,000,000; another testified that it was 1 in 4,000,000. The Court of Appeals reversed the father's conviction, on the grounds that the statistical evidence did not satisfy Frye-Reed: reviewing the issue de novo, the Court of Appeals found that because there were several studies suggesting that there might be a genetic component to SIDS, the children's deaths were not proved to be independent, and the product rule could not be used.
The prosecutor had remarked in closing argument that there was a one in 10 million chance-not that the deaths were not homicides-but that the accused was innocent. The Court of Appeals held that the prosecutors' remark was not cured by the trial judge's subsequent instruction.
50.
In an age discrimination suit, expert analyses from the year in which the plaintitT was fired conclude that 59.2% of the workforce were older, but that older employees accounted for 70.3% of those terminated in employer's reduction in force, and that there was a less than 5% probability that age was related to termination by chance. Admit?
51.
The plaintiff also otTers analyses trom the following year, also comparing active exempt employees with employees selected for termination, but as to which the expert admitted that there were inadequacies in the popUlation used and that the results would have been different had she been able to identify and exclude nonexempt employees from her analysis. 
Frve-Reed
But "novel" scientific evidence that has not been recognized by statute (e.g., voiceprint, lie detector tests, the causation of cancer by a particular agent), must be formally proved. The federal and Maryland rules have taken ditTerent paths regarding the proof required.
In Maryland state court, until a principle has been held to have gained general acceptance among scientists in the relevant field, testimony based upon that principle will be inadmissible. Once it has gained such acceptance, testimony based upon it will be admissible, as long as the expert is qualified, the evidence will be helpful, and is relevant to the other evidence in the case. § 2.
Maryland State Court: Frye-Reed
The leading and incredibly brief decision in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 CD. C. Cir. 1923) concerned an early predecessor of the current polygraph test. It was held inadmissible, although it was the defendant who offered the evidence, as exculpatory. Frye established a requirement that scientific evidence will become admissible only when the underlying principle or process has gained "general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." Under Frye, until the relevant scientists generally agree that the principle or process is sound, its results will be inadmissible.
Fifty-five years later, in Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374 (1978), a case involving a "voiceprint" offered by the prosecution, the Court of Appeals adopted the Frye test in a four to three decision.
• What policy arguments support Frye-Reed, which sets a high bar for admissibility of scientific evidence? (See majority opinion by Judge Eldridge, joined by Judges Cole, Drapps, and Levine.) Although the FRE went into effect in 1975, the federal courts were divided for 18 years as to whether the FRE had codified Frye or jettisoned it. In Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 597 (1993), the United States Supreme Court held that FRE 702 had overruled Frye. Daubert held, on the one hand, that the federal trial courts do have a gate-keeping function to exclude "junk science." But it also held that there is no hard and fast requirement that novel scientific evidence have gained general acceptance in its field before it will be admissible.
Rather, the test for admissibility is a flexible one, requiring FRE 401 relevance, FRE 702 reliability, and a final screening under FRE 403. The Daubert Court suggested that, in making its "gatekeeping" determination, the trial court consider, inter alia, whether the proffered expert's technique or theory (1) can be or has been tested in some objective sense, (2) has been subject to peer review and publication, and (3) has been generally accepted in the particular field; the court should also look at (4) the technique or theory's known or potential rate of error, and (5) standards and controls. No one factor provides a litmus test. Therefore, even evidence that has gained "general acceptance" may be excluded in federal court, just as evidence that has not gained "general acceptance" may be admitted in federal comi. A 2000 amendment to FRE 702 codified the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert and its progeny by adding, as explicit conditions to the admission of expert testimony, that "( 1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case." FRE 702 now reads:
In its decision in
Rule 702. TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, kill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, ifCl) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
The amendment made the federal rule more similar to the language of Md. Rule 5-702, which requires the court to find that expert testimony is appropriate "on the particular subject" and that "a sufficient factual basis exists to support the expert Under Daubert, the federal district court must hold a pretrial hearing and make specific factual findings supporting its conclusion. We review the district court's implementation of the Daubert framework with respect to the admission of expert testimony de novo. Once we are convinced that the district court properly applied the Daubert framework, however, we review the decision to admit or exclude the expert testimony for an abuse of discretion. § 4.
The Maryland Rules of Evidence
When adopting Title 5 of the Maryland Rules, the Court of Appeals of Maryland chose not to be explicit as to whether it would follow Daubert or instead retain the FryeReed standard. From 1994 to date there has been no indication of movement in Maryland away from Frye-Reed.
On the contrary, the Committee note to Md. Rule 5-702 was amended in 1999 to reaffirm Frye-Reed. apply to this medical opinion evidence, which was not "presented as a scientific test the results of which were controlled by inexorably physical laws;" in the future, "when ruling on whether to receive State proffered evidence of PTSD a trial judge will have to weigh the benefit of the evidence not only against potential unfair prejudice, but also against the complexity of possibly accompanying issues and against the time required properly to try the expanded case"). Requiring general acceptance will force us to wait longer to admit novel scientific evidence, even though it is reliable and will eventually gain general acceptance in its field.
x.
Difficulties in Application of
One apparent advantage of the DaubertlKumho Tire 401-702-403 test is that a similar approach may be used in all expert testimony situations, so that errors such as those in Myers and Sabatier for failing to apply Frye-Reed when it should be applied or vice-versa, can be avoided. But Daubert also has caused similar problems, as well as vastly multiplied lengthy pretrial hearings on expert testimony. § 2.
How Absolute certainty of result or unanimity of scientific opinion is not required for admissibility. * * * Unless an exaggerated popular opinion of the accuracy of a particular technique makes its use prejudicial or likely to mislead the jury, it is better to admit relevant scientific evidence in the same manner as other expert testimony and allow its weight to be attacked by cross-examination and refutation. Judge Grimm concluded that the arresting officer could not refer, at trial on the merits (as opposed to the probable cause issue) to field sobriety tests -"walk and tum," "one leg stand," and "horizontal gaze nystagmus" -as tests, as they fail to meet Daubert standards when offered to prove blood alcohol content. The officer could testify to his observations:
In so doing, however, the officer may not use value-added descriptive language to characterize the subject's performance of the SFSTs, such as saying that the subject 'failed the test' or 'exhibited' a certain number of 'standardized clues' during the test; (5) Ifthe Government introduces evidence that a defendant exhibited nystagmus when the officer perfornled the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, the defendant may bring out either during cross examination of the prosecution witnesses or by asking the Court to take judicial notice of the fact that there are many causes of nystagmus other than alcohol ingestion; and (6) If otherwise admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 701, a police officer may give lay opinion testimony that a defendant was driving while intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol. In doing so, however, the officer may not bolster the lay opinion testimony by reference to any scientific, technical or specialized information learned from law enforcement or traffic safety instruction, but must confine his or her testimony to helpful firsthand observations of the defendant.
XII. Trends: Computers as Experts
See, e.g., as to Computational fluid dynamics: Admission of evidence regarding expert's use of computer models to measure flow of air around and through a jet engine affirmed. Questions regarding correctness of models, etc., used went to weight of the testimony. 
